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Israel Kirzner has made distinguished contributions to many areas of economics, 
including methodology, capital theory and the history of economic thought. His 
elucidation of the nature of competition and entrepreneurship must surely rank among his 
most important achievements. His writings in that area were influential in the 
development of my own thinking about privatisation, competition and regulation of the 
utilities. Subsequently, the regulation of the British electricity industry reflected his and 




The present paper presents an analysis and defence of competition in retail electricity 
supply, including some account of its development in the UK. For all practical purposes 
such competition did not exist until a dozen years ago.
3 Its development illustrates a 
number of the themes in Israel Kirzner’s writing – for example, the nature of competition 
as a process over time, the entrepreneurial and learning nature of this process, the role of 
marketing in alerting customers, the role of competition in establishing market price and 
in discovering the services and suppliers that customers prefer, and the advantages of 
competition over regulation (Kirzner, 1973, 1985). It illustrates also the arguments of 
other Austrian writers to whose work Kirzner has drawn attention (e.g. Hayek 1948, 
Schumpeter 1950). A lack of familiarity with some of these ideas may have led to some 
                                                 
1 This paper has been published in Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, September 2002. We 
are grateful to the publishers for granting permission to include it in the joint  CMI Electricity Project/ 
Department of Applied Economics, Univeristy of Cambridge, working paper series. 
2 Beesley and Littlechild, 1989, Littlechild, 1999, 2001a,c, 2002a,b. See also the writings of the late 
Michael Beesley, e.g. “Practical regulation, I argue, must involve using Hayekian and Schumpeterian 
insights.” (Beesley, 1997, 24) 
3 In a few parts of the US and elsewhere there used to be competition between electricity companies, each 
providing its own generation and wires, but not competing across the distribution networks as discussed 
below. There was limited provision for the latter concept for a few large industrial customers in Chile a few 
years before it was systematically established in the UK.   2
scepticism about retail competition in the electricity sector. I hope this paper will 




Retail competition in electricity is the ability of a customer to choose a preferred retail 
supplier, sometimes called an electricity service provider (ESP). That retail supplier or 
service provider has the right of access to the local distribution network to which the 
customer is connected. The supplier typically generates its own electricity or buys it from 
a generator or trader or in an electricity Pool. The supplier pays the relevant transmission 
and distribution charges, typically on published, non-discriminatory and regulated terms. 
The supplier is typically responsible for meter-reading, billing, collection, complaint 
handling and possibly other services, and for setting its own retail price and other terms
 4.  
 
Some degree of retail competition has been implemented in almost all countries that have 
introduced competition in generation. Most countries now allow large industrial 
customers to choose their supplier, and many countries have also allowed medium–sized 
customers to do so. The main discussion has arisen over whether and how retail 
competition should be extended to residential customers – what is sometimes known as 
“full” retail competition.  
 
By the end of 2000 full retail competition had been implemented in the UK, Norway, 
Sweden, New Zealand, Germany and several States in the US. In March 2001 a draft 
European Union (EU) Directive proposed that it be implemented throughout the EU by 
January 2005. 
 
There has been resistance in some countries. France vetoed the proposed EU Directive in 
April 2001, citing the problems in California. Arkansas, due to open its retail market in 
2003, recommended delay or repeal. California itself, which had introduced full retail 
competition in 1998, repealed retail competition for all electricity customers in 
September 2001.
5 However, the general trend continues. In January 2002 full retail 
competition was implemented in Australia (Victoria and New South Wales) and Texas, 
and is still scheduled for implementation in Holland in 2004. In April 2002 the EU agreed 
to open the market to all medium-sized customers - some two thirds of the total – by 
2004, and it is expected that the issue of full retail competition will be reconsidered 
before too long. 
 
In parallel with this political debate, there has been academic and other debate about the 
merits and effects of full retail competition. Some UK and US commentators have 
questioned whether the benefits of retail competition outweigh the costs, at least for 
smaller and residential customers. 
                                                 
4  The supplier might purchase some services such as meter reading from the local distribution company, 
and in some cases might be responsible for providing or servicing the meter. Certain network-related 
complaints and enquiries might be handled by the distribution company rather than by the supplier. 
5 This was primarily to enable the State to recover the costs of the high-priced long-term contracts that it 
had entered into, rather than a rejection of retail competition per se. (Littlechild, 2002b)   3
 
In view of this scepticism, this paper explains in more detail the benefits of retail 
competition, particularly for residential customers. Experience in the UK, and the cost-
benefit debate there, are used to illustrate the arguments. Parallel papers (Littlechild 
2002a,c) provide a critique of regulatory policies in this area. 
 
 
II  The Nature and Benefits of Retail Competition 
 
Retail competition in general 
 
Some functions of the retailer are well understood. For example, Joskow (2000b) has 
suggested that retailers in general exist and prosper because they add value to what 
consumers would receive if they purchased directly in the wholesale market. Important 
ways in which they do this are by selling at convenient locations and times, providing 
complementary products and extensive inventories, providing point-of-sale and post-sale 
services, passing on in lower retail prices the benefits of wholesale buying power, 
reducing retailing costs, and developing a reputation for accurate information about 
quality and service. 
 
That retailers do perform these important functions is not in dispute. However, a 
perspective that sees the wholesale market as central and pre-existing, and as determining 
price, with retailing relevant only to the extent that it can offer better quality service, will 
tend to underestimate the role of retail competition, particularly with respect to price. In 
practice, the retail market is the relevant one for customers. Direct access to the 
wholesale market is a marketing tactic used by some participants, but not the starting 
point for customers.  
 
Retailers can help to create relevant products for manufacturers. For example, some 
retailers seek out and commission products at prices and qualities that they think will 
appeal to customers
6. By offering different terms of payment, retailers can effectively 
introduce different products. They can enable customers to appreciate the existence of 
products and product variations, and terms on which these are available, that are likely to 
be attractive to them. They can stimulate the alertness of customers to the availability of 
better prices than they are presently paying, or likely to pay in future. In addition, active 
retailers can intensify competition between manufacturers.  
 
Not all retailers are equally satisfactory.  And which manufacturers offer best value is 
constantly liable to change over time, given uncertain and changing market conditions, 
changing product qualities and the entrance and exit of different producers.  Retailers 
therefore add value by developing a reputation, not only for providing accurate 
                                                 
6 7-Eleven’s “more aggressive approach towards merchandising” is a nice example of entrepreneurial 
alertness by a retailer. “Recently the group spotted that customers who bought Kraft’s Crystal Light 
powdered soft drinks were buying bottled water to mix it with. It suggested that Kraft make a bottled drink, 
and secured an exclusive deal to sell the 20oz bottles.” (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2001).    4
information and delivering on promises about quality, but also for consistently offering 
the best prices. 
 
In sum, retailers are not just adjuncts to manufacturers. They play an integral part in the 
competitive market process that tends to deliver to customers the products and services 
they most want at the best prices that can be obtained from the most efficient producers 
and retailers at any time. (Cf. Kirzner 1973; Hayek 1948; Hayek 1978, 179-90) 
 
How retailers provide value added in electricity 
 
It has been suggested that there is less scope for retailing to add value in the electricity 
sector, given the special attributes of the latter. It is true that, at present, the costs of 
metering and the load-profiling rules necessary for retail competition limit the range of 
terms and services that can be offered. A review of experience to date (Joskow (2000a, 
182) concludes that 
 
The societal benefits of retail competition per se are more apparent so far for 
larger commercial and industrial customers than for residential and small 
commercial customers.  Successful Electricity Service Providers (ESPs) are 
offering them [larger customers] a whole package of energy management and 
energy procurement services covering electricity, natural gas, on-site generation, 
and price and weather-risk hedging products.” [However,] “there is no evidence 
that ESPs are yet providing small customers with much, if anything, in the way of 
value-added services (such as real-time pricing)… The major value-added 
services being offered to small consumers are ‘green power’ (energy supplied 
from designated environmentally friendly generating technologies, such as solar 
and wind power) and bundling of electricity, gas, telephone, and Internet services 
(one-stop shopping). Perhaps new technologies will reduce the costs of marketing, 
billing, real-time metering, and control for smaller customers in the future. 
 
These are indeed value-added services that retailers have brought to the market, and there 
are likely to be more in future. Whether the observed greater rate of switching by large 
customers is primarily due to the new services cited is another matter. It also, and perhaps 
mainly, reflects the better prices and other terms offered by competitors.  It no doubt also 
reflects the levels of incumbents’ tariffs prescribed by the regulators, in relation to the 
costs of efficient provision, and the terms on which other retailers can participate in the 
market (not least the “shopping credits”)
7. 
 
Concerns that retail competition in electricity has initially focused on prices rather than 
“value-added services” seem misplaced. Such a focus is to be expected. It is not just that 
electricity is broadly homogeneous, so that the scope for adjusting the quality of the 
electricity itself is severely limited, at least in the short term.  More importantly, a key 
function of retail competition is precisely to carry out the process of price formation in 
the market.  That process has been suppressed or distorted by government and regulatory 
policies in all countries over the last fifty years or more.  The obvious consequence of 
                                                 
7 For critiques of these, see Joskow (2000b) and Littlechild (2002c).   5
removing such policy constraints is to set into action the market’s price formation 
process. 
 
The social value of electricity retailing is that it establishes the prices that are the best that 
suppliers can offer at any time, and it identifies how these prices differ by product 
attribute, such as time of day and duration into the future. As a result, retailers and 
customers can make more informed decisions about, respectively, what to supply and 
what to consume. Generators in turn can make more informed decisions about what 
products and terms to offer to retailers, as illustrated below. Over the longer term the 
level and structure of prices established in the retail and wholesale markets inform 
generators’ decisions on what kinds of plant to build and/or retire (e.g peaking or base 
load). 
 
There may be concerns about the profitability of taking advantage of consumer ignorance 
and misperceptions.  
‘Green power’ is sold to consumers who are willing to pay a premium because 
they want there to be more ‘green power’ generated. However, the amount being 
sold is less than the current amount of ‘green power’. Thus, it doesn’t increase the 
percentage of environmentally friendly power generation. Is this an economic 
improvement allowing the customer to get what he wants or is it a way to get 
money from the gullible?
8 
 
There is obviously a question whether purchasers of ‘green power’ do want there to be 
more such power generated. (If they simply want to assure themselves that their own 
purchases are ‘green’ the objection does not apply.) Setting this aside, the answer in brief 
is that the discovery of a new, valued and hitherto unappreciated attribute of an existing 
product constitutes an economic improvement from the customer’s perspective. The 
competitive process is more likely than a regulated monopoly to ensure a) that such 
valued attributes are discovered and b) that (in the absence of barriers to entry) they are 
provided at prices that do not exceed the additional cost involved. If the price established 
in the market exceeded the cost of generating ‘green power’, a competitive market would 
indeed tend to increase the percentage of environmentally friendly power generation. 
 
The same commentator wonders whether the market’s price formation process “is merely 
a way to allow those with low transactions costs for switching to shift sunk costs on to 
those with high transactions costs for switching.” It seems unlikely that electricity is more 
problematic in this respect than other markets, at least in the UK
9. But if switching costs 
are high, this simply highlights the value to suppliers of a) discovering ways by which 
customers can realise where better prices are on offer without incurring such costs, and b) 
developing a reputation for offering reasonable prices. The latter is an important part of 
                                                 
8 These and some other later comments derive from an anonymous referee of an earlier version of this 
paper. 
9 For example, “an independent MORI survey found that almost 90 per cent of people who have switched 
their gas and electricity supplier have found it easy or very easy. … The current rate of switching (38 per 
cent in electricity and 37 per cent in gas) is higher than in any other comparable industry, including 6 per 
cent for current bank accounts, 11 per cent for fixed-line telephones and 2 per cent for mortgages, and 
second only to car insurance.” Ofgem News Release PN 5, 18 January 2002.   6
the market process, which tends not only to identify the best prices on offer (and 
eliminate the worse ones) but also to identify the best retailers (and indirectly the best 
generators). As in any market, some may prosper temporarily by deception. However, 
those who best perceive and supply what customers want, on an economical basis, will 
tend to survive and expand.  Those that are less efficient, or whose performance does not 
live up to its promise, will tend to disappear. Initially they may lose market share and/or 
profits, later they may be taken over. 
 
III Examples from the UK electricity industry 
 
The experience of Britain illustrates the process that, to a greater or lesser extent, has 
been observed in countries around the world when retail competition has been allowed 
and price restraints removed, particularly for larger and medium-sized customers.   
 
The learning process 
 
For the first time, customers who were not satisfied with what they got could go to 
another retailer. So for the first time in living memory, the incumbent utilities asked their 
customers what they wanted.  Uniform fixed price, time of day or time of year prices, 
interruptible prices, Pool prices? All retailers including incumbent utilities could buy in 
the Pool, but this was only one aspect of the wholesale market. They asked what 
generators could offer in the way of hedges against uncertain future prices. (These were 
typically in the form of contracts for differences around Pool prices.) They discussed 
contracts for base load, mid-merit and peaking electricity, and back-to-back arrangements 
with customer load.  They explored different contract durations, for a month, a year or a 
longer term.  They translated these various costs into offers to customers, trying to match 
the best offers by other retailers in the market where they judged it economic to do so.  
They assessed customer response, and tried to put together portfolios of purchase 
contracts to match their projected sales to customers, with some judgements about 
exposure to risk and in the light of their underlying strategies about business policy and 
market share.  
 
The customers, meanwhile, were also active.  They needed to know what was on offer 
and to evaluate what would best suit them.  They needed to estimate their likely 
electricity consumption, often aggregated over many plants, to work out load factors and 
seasonal variations, and their scope for load management at times of high prices.  They 
needed to put competing offers on a common foundation, so as to evaluate them 
accurately.  They needed to judge whether to buy at Pool price or on contract, whether to 
commit for one year or several, and whether to put all their purchases with one supplier 
or to spread them.  They variously talked to industry associations, commissioned market 
intelligence and formed buying groups.   
 
Initially, a great variety of types of deal were on offer. Retailers and customers were 
clearly seeking to establish how best to buy and sell electricity. Out of this process there 
gradually emerged a set of prices for a more or less standardised set of products.  The 
process established which product attributes were most significant, and put numbers on   7
these.  For example, the market established not just “the retail price of electricity”, but 
also whether location or size of each customer’s consumption were important, and how 
the price depended on load factor, the degree of cover, duration of contract, and so on. Of 
course, some customers initially chose types of contract that in retrospect were not as 
advantageous as other types. But the same was true of retailers
10. 
 
There was a parallel discovery process in the wholesale market. Generators and suppliers 
were both seeking protection against the risks of the Pool spot price. The Pool was not a 
market in the normal sense. Retailers and generators bought and sold there not because 
they chose to but because they were legally required to do so, and the price was 
determined by an administrative mechanism
11. Contracts for differences around the Pool 
price were the vehicles by which wholesale market competition took place (excluding the 
initial contracts facilitated by government).  The nature and duration of these contracts 
gradually evolved over time. They were determined by the needs of the parties that, in the 
case of the retailers, were in turn determined by the requirements of the increasingly 
competitive retail market. So the retail market was an integral determinant of the products 
traded in the wholesale market.  
  
Examples of improved services  
 
The following are five examples of the retailers’ role in creating and discovering new and 
more attractive terms on which electricity can be sold, particularly with respect to price. 
The first two apply mainly to larger customers, though in principle are also applicable to 
smaller ones. 
 
Before privatisation, certain “extra large” customers in Britain had received lower prices 
in return for signing interruptible contracts that in practice were never interrupted.  After 
the competitive market was opened, retailers found that better-defined interruptible 
contracts provided an option midway between fixed price and uncertain Pool price. After 
some initial shocked protests this proved attractive to many customers.  
 
For large customers, an early benefit of retail competition was the willingness of 
suppliers to offer greater flexibility of billing: either monthly or quarterly or, in principle, 
any other frequency; either site by site or aggregated; and with whatever degree of 
                                                 
10 A simple example will illustrate the learning process.  One generator, new to the retail market, thought it 
prudent in the first year of competition to offer the same structure of charges as the distribution companies 
had offered before privatisation - a Standard Time Of Day or STOD tariff - but with a specified percentage 
reduction on each component.  In the second year, in response to customer requests for simplicity, it 
offered a single all-in-one price per unit, covering energy cost, metering cost, charges for use of distribution 
and transmission system, with no separate elements for fixed charge or any distinction between night and 
day charges.  This proved very popular.  But the generator found, to its dismay, that the customers no 
longer had any incentive to restrain their usage at the expensive peak hours, and indeed its offer had 
appealed most strongly to precisely those customers who most wanted to expand usage at such hours.  In 
the third year, severely burned, the generator reverted to a distinction between peak and off-peak prices. 
11 Pool price in each half hour was set equal to the marginal bid price in that half hour. However, there were 
complex rules as to which generating sets counted and which did not, and the algorithm for setting prices 
was not generally available. So there was some lack of transparency as to how Pool prices were actually 
set.    8
analysis of usage the customer wanted.  Information about usage at individual sites, for 
example, has enabled the energy management centres of some supermarket chains to 
identify where faulty freezer equipment needs replacing. 
 
For residential customers, a benefit of retail competition has been the willingness of some 
suppliers to offer tariffs without fixed monthly charges.  It has long been a complaint of 
some small users that they have to pay regardless of whether they use any electricity.  It 
may be that some costs are incurred even if a customer uses no electricity, and that 
customers have to pay for this in some other way.  Rival suppliers are pointing this out in 
their advertising.  But the point is that retail competition is delivering, as an option, a 
preferred way of charging that was previously refused
12. 
 
Several suppliers have sought to develop services of particular relevance to 
disadvantaged customers.  For example, 
We, as a national player, decided that we were going to target all aspects of the 
public, not just the rich or more affluent.  We wanted to be an energy supplier to 
everybody.  This includes the poorer members of society, which also includes 
many elderly people.  Many of these older people were the least comfortable with 
the opportunity to switch electricity supplier.  So, we worked with Age Concern 
to develop a product that would help old people to switch, get better value for 
money day-to-day, and also provide them with fuel saving benefits during the 
winter, including cold weather payments.(Baldwin, 2000, 8) 
 
In similar vein, Eastern/TXU has recently offered residential electricity at a fixed price 
per month, dependent on the size of family and type of house, but independent of the 
actual consumption.  This has attractions for those customers for whom the uncertain and 
variable size of the electricity bill presents problems
13.  
 
IV Additional social benefits of retail competition 
 
A successful retailing sector can create additional social value by improving the 
performance of other sectors of the market. 
 
Stimulating competition in generation 
 
                                                 
12 The referee mentioned earlier suggests that offering multiple price plans is a way to extract economic 
rent. But here the innovation is the offering of a single price plan. And whereas a monopolist may be able 
to extract rent in this way, in a competitive market the ability to do so is limited by the willingness of 
competitors to offer better terms. 
13 The electricity is metered as normal, and such readings are used for charging generation and distribution 
costs to the supplier, but not for purposes of the supplier’s bill to the customer. The supplier retains the 
right to revise the terms offered in the light of actual usage. The referee says “it is to be expected that the 
supplier will take advantage of customer inattention and inertia, raising the price for those who use more 
electricity but not lowering it for those who use less.” However, the ability to discriminate in this way is 
limited by the need to maintain a credible reputation and by the ability of competitors to alert customers to 
any shady practice and to offer better terms.   9
Retailers can stimulate greater price responsiveness and/or greater forward contracting by 
customers, both of which can reduce the incentives for generators to withhold supply and 
drive up prices.  A greater diversity of buyers in the wholesale markets can increase 
liquidity and increase opportunities for generators to lay off risks at competitive market 
prices (Cf. Joskow, 2000a, 22-4; Goulding et. al., 1999). 
 
UK experience confirms this, and suggests that retail competition stimulates competition 
in generation to an even greater degree. The difference is between an active and a passive 
buying side of the market.  A retailer exposed to competition knows that it has already 
lost customers and may lose more if its prices are not competitive.  It knows that it has 
won customers elsewhere and can win more if its prices are competitive.  It knows that 
the effectiveness of its buying strategy will be directly translated, not only into market 
share, but also into the bottom line profit and loss of its business.  In contrast, a retailer 
with a monopoly over all or a significant part of its customer base
14, with arrangements to 
pass through reasonable purchasing costs, is not exposed to any such risks on market 
share.  It knows that (subject to the detail of regulatory process) its profit is broadly 
independent of its wholesale purchasing strategy. 
 
The differences in strategy are manifest in various ways.  Examples include the time and 
effort that a retailer will spend trying to find, negotiate for and secure the best price from 
a generator or trader; the willingness to take exposed positions if contract cover is not 
available on acceptable terms; the duration of forward contracts accepted; the 
imagination and effort put into designing and considering new contractual forms; the 
willingness or otherwise to accept non-price elements of deals, and so on.  The 
differences are manifest, too, in a greater willingness to seek out generators with whom to 
trade, perhaps smaller ones or those embedded in local distribution networks or on-site 
generators, that it might not otherwise have been worth approaching.  Importantly, there 
is a greater willingness by retailers to encourage new entrants into generation provided 
this offers competitive advantage to them, whereas monopoly retailers with generation 
pass-through arrangements may be indifferent to this (or may encourage uneconomic 
entry by their affiliates). 
 
The net effect of all this is that opening up retail competition puts greater pressure on 
generators to offer better deals.  There is a keener wholesale market, offering lower prices 
and greater responsiveness as a result of greater efficiency, greater participation by 
incumbents and new entrants, and greater need to innovate in response to customer 
demand. 
 
Measuring this is not straightforward but some evidence from the UK may be relevant.  
During the four years 1994/5 to 1997/8, the average generation cost reportedly incurred 
by Public Electricity Suppliers to supply the monopoly franchise market was about 17% 
higher than Pool price.  Part of this was attributable to contracts entered into before 
privatisation, or facilitated by the Government to assist the coal industry.  The average 
ratio of cost to Pool price for such contracts was about 20%, compared to about 14% on 
the contracts entered into on a more commercial basis (OFFER, 1996; OFFER/Ofgem, 
                                                 
14 Residential and small business customers typically account for around half the total market demand.   10
1999).  In contrast, the average ratio of costs to Pool price in the competitive non-
franchise market was very much lower and often not much above Pool price.   
 
The figures should not be taken too precisely.  They reflect amongst other things the ratio 
of contract prices signed several years earlier to the subsequent course of Pool prices that 
could have turned out quite differently.  They also reflect the allocation of contract costs 
between markets, which was no doubt influenced by the existence of a monopoly 
franchise and a pass-through price control.  Nonetheless, they suggest that suppliers in 
monopoly markets are more subject to non-commercial influences and less keen to 
achieve the lowest available purchase prices. More broadly, retail competition makes it 
more difficult for a government to persuade market participants to act non-commercially 
at the expense of customers
15. 
 
Other social benefits of retail supply competition 
 
A robust retail market is manifest in a more liquid wholesale market.  This is partly due 
to the increased number and diversity of buyers in the markets, in the sense of more and 
different electricity retailers.  More striking, in Britain and no doubt elsewhere, has been 
the growth of financial intermediaries (including subsidiaries of some retailers 
themselves) that have been willing to take risks, arbitrage positions, and put together 
attractive packages for retailers from disparate components offered by generators or other 
intermediaries.  An important factor in the growth of these intermediaries has been the 
increased keenness of retailers’ demand, stimulated by retail competition, for the 
products that financial intermediaries can offer. 
 
Active retailers will seek to reduce costs at all stages of the supply chain.  As noted, this 
includes the potential opportunities to reduce the costs of retailing per se, and to secure 
lower generation costs and risks. Active retailers will seek ways to reduce the costs of 
transmission and distribution too. Examples include encouraging on-site generation (to 
provide lower price as well as higher quality service) and combined heat and power 
plants
16, installation of larger generation capacity than the on-site demand (to sell the 
balance to market), installation of direct links between local generation and local demand 
(by-passing the local distribution network), construction of (more) interconnections 
between adjacent systems, and so on.  The social benefit of retail competition, in addition 
to the lower supply costs achieved, includes the greater pressure for efficiency put on 
transmission and distribution businesses - for example, in terms of new investment 
decisions, operating and construction costs, relating prices to costs, innovation, and 
attitude to customers. 
                                                 
15 The referee says “This is undoubtedly true. But is it a good thing? If the government is corrupt, it is. 
However, if the government is concerned with non-commercial aspects of the public good, it may well not 
be.” The evidence on the results of government ownership and regulation is now quite extensive, and 
readers can form their own view. The recent repeal of retail competition in California in order to be able to 
recover the cost of the State’s $10 billion venture into electricity purchasing may not be an irrelevant piece 
of evidence. 
16 In the US, the PURPA of 1978 required utilities to buy power from co-generators at avoided cost, which 
was not the case in the UK. However, in the absence of a competitive market there may have been a 
distortion of the extent of cogeneration in both cases.   11
 
The introduction and extension of retail competition has another indirect impact on 
pricing and efficiency even in monopoly sectors of the industry. It increases the political 
and economic pressure for improved cost allocation, both within and by the regulated 
utilities. It also provides more information as to what allocations of cost do reflect cost 
causality, than would be available from integrated utilities in the absence of competition.  
This better information stems, inter alia, from the performance of retail suppliers and 
distribution businesses trading as separate entities, from observation of the costs of new 
entrants into retailing and into other unbundled activities, and from the arguments put 
forward by a variety of parties with different interests and knowledge. Better information 
facilitates the setting of price controls on monopoly businesses such as distribution 




It has been argued (e.g.Watts, 2001) that retail competition precludes the signing of long 
term-contracts, which are “the best available cure for the bad effects of short-term price 
volatility and market power in the spot market.” It is widely agreed that contracts can 
indeed smooth prices to customers and curb market power in the spot markets. Analyses 
of California’s experience have generally recognised that an important part of the 
problem lay in the regulatory prohibition on such contracts (e.g. Joskow 2001). However, 
retail competition does not prevent either customers or suppliers from signing long-term 
contracts.  
 
Watts says “I, as an individual residential consumer, cannot sign such long-term 
contracts. It would be too expensive to solicit them and almost impossible for whomever 
I might sign them with to enforce them.” However, there is no evidence that most 
customers wish to enter long-term contracts. Even large industrial customers typically 
sign one-year contracts. A disadvantage of retail monopoly is that utilities and regulators, 
who do not have to test their judgements in the market, are typically not well-placed to 
judge the costs and risks of long-term contracts. They can nevertheless force customers to 
enter such contracts and to bear the resulting costs and risks.  
 
Watts also says “now that I have these choices [of retail supplier], my local utility can no 
longer safely sign a long-term contract for electricity because, if electricity costs go 
down, I am free to leave it for a cheaper supplier.” However, this should not be an 
obstacle to a confident utility: if the contract is really worth signing the utility could 
match any price reductions to customers and still come out ahead. A consequence of 
retail competition is that suppliers who wish to sign long-term contracts have to back 
their own judgements rather than pass the risk to customers; this is likely improve the 
quality of decision-making. Retail suppliers do in fact sign long-term contracts as well as 
shorter term ones. Some suppliers have purchased generating plant or the rights to its 
output, which can be thought of as a very long-term (lifetime) contract.
17  
                                                 
17 A recent example is the following. “Centrica has entered into a 17-year tolling agreement with Intergen 
for the total capacity of the 860MW gas-fired plant to be built in Spalding, Lincolnshire. … The 
arrangement will add further support to Centrica’s strategy of having a proportion of its retail electricity   12
 
V  Retail Competition and Electricity Prices 
 
There is a concern that retail competition could increase costs and prices rather than 
reduce them. This is because the scope for savings from competition is small but the 
scope for cost increases is significant.  
Retailing costs (metering, billing, customer services, and the like) represent a very 
small part of the average customer’s electricity bill – less than 5 per cent. 
…Significant costs are associated with developing load profiles and settlements 
protocols to match up monthly metered consumption for individual consumers 
with wholesale market prices that vary hourly. ESPs must incur significant 
additional advertising, promotion, and marketing costs….Some smaller customers 
may actually be harmed by retail competition because the large advertising, 
marketing and billing costs that the ESPs incur must eventually find their way 
into the prices that retail customers pay for service. (Joskow, 2000b, 177, 181-2, 
185) 
 
Data on the components of turnover for the aggregate supply businesses of the 14 Public 
Electricity Suppliers (PESs) in Britain in 1995/96 show a similar figure of 5% for average 
supply business costs and profits. Later figures published in 1999 show a higher 
proportion (13%) for residential customers. At that time the regulator proposed a 
correction in cost allocation procedures that would increase the proportion to 17%
18. This 
implies rather more scope for retail competition to reduce these costs. 
Would retail competition be likely to increase customer service costs such as advertising, 
promotion and marketing, as suppliers compete to attract customers? The empirical 
evidence does not support this claim for large and medium-sized customers in the UK.  
There was apparently no increase in these costs from 1994/95 to 1996/97, after the 
market for medium-sized customers opened up in Britain.  There was in fact a reduction 
in bad debt costs. (OFFER, 1997, 52-4, Figs. 11 a,b). 
 
There was an increase in the supply business operating costs of the PESs after the market 
opened completely in 1998.
19  Many of the suppliers were keen to retain or attract small 
business and residential customers and incurred significant costs in doing so. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
demand met by its own sources. The deal will give Centrica the total plant capacity rights for a combination 
of fixed and market-related tolling payments. Centrica will source the gas and will be able to dispatch the 
plant flexibly, while Intergen will bear the operational risk. The deal also means that Centrica does not have 
to commit any capital. As a separate point, we note that deals such as this are allowing new power plants to 
reach financial close in spite of the low wholesale prices in the UK.” Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, 
Valuation Spreadsheet, European Utilities, 27 May 2002, p. 2. 
18 “Supply business costs and margins in 1998/99 accounted for about 13% of a typical domestic 
customer’s annual bill.  The proposed transfer of costs from PESs’ distribution to supply businesses would 
increase this proportion to about 17%.” (Ofgem, 1999, 62). 
19 See Ofgem (1999, 66, Table 7.4).  The average increase from 1997/8 to 1998/9 was 23%.  This may have 
included one-off costs and is not necessarily a fair reflection of ongoing costs.  It also reflects the 
companies’ allocations of costs to the under 100kW and first-tier (within area) customers that may not have 
been unaffected by the ongoing price control review.   13
It would be wrong to suggest, however, that prices would simply rise to cover whatever 
retailing costs were incurred, on a sort of cost-plus basis.  The direction of causation is 
the opposite.  The amount that competitive retailers find it worthwhile to spend to keep or 
attract customers is limited by the margin they can derive from such customers, which in 
turn is constrained by the prices in the market.  Crudely, it is worth paying up to the 
present value of the likely profit margin, calculated over a plausible time for which the 
customer might stay with that retailer.  Re-evaluations of plans have been evident in the 
British market.  Retailers who started out with ideas of TV advertising soon found that 
this was not justified by the prospective margins, and had to develop more cost-effective 
ways of attracting customers, initially by door-to-door selling (which was much 
criticised
20) and later by other methods.
21 
 
After several decades of cost-plus regulation and/or public ownership, with politically 
determined and fossilised market structures, it would not be surprising if prices were 
initially significantly different from costs. Prices might indeed be above the costs that an 
efficient competitive retailer would expect to incur. It would not be surprising to find 
unexploited economies of scale and scope in retailing
22. By the same token, retailers 
might be willing to incur significant marketing costs to attract additional customers
23.  
These costs may reduce as retail competition intensifies, and as experience and 
innovation indicate more economic or satisfactory ways to attract customers.
24  Prices 
might of course rise if previous levels are not sustainable in a competitive market. 
Marketing costs will generally be above pre-competition levels. But is there any reason to 
believe they would be out of line with the levels that obtain in other competitive markets? 
 
With retail competition, higher marketing costs could be offset by reductions in other 
components of cost. Joskow (2000a, 31, fn. 25) estimates that utility advertising expenses 
are less than 0.5% of retail service costs, and that sales costs (including advertising) are 
                                                 
20 In the first year of electricity competition there were some 4,900 complaints about high pressure or 
misleading selling practices. However, that number was only about one complaint per thousand transfers. 
The proportion has now fallen to about half the previous level. Complaints about erroneous transfers is  
presently running at about three times that level (i.e. 1.5 per 1000 transfers), but it too has halved. House of 
Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, Eleventh Report, Session 2001-02, 10 December 2001. 
21  For example, “Only about 50% of [our] customers now come from door-to-door sales, originally it was 
100%.  We are looking to increase the internet and telemarketing to progressively reduce the door-to-door 
selling.  Initially door-to-door was necessary to open the market up, giving people personal contact, but it is 
difficult to manage, leading to a number of customer complaints. … For a customer-focussed company, 
you do not want to be mis-selling, you don’t want to see high levels of complaints because people are not 
selling your product properly.  It is much easier to manage and control via telemarketing, affinity schemes 
and the internet.” (Baldwin, 2000, 8). 
22 The referee says “if they exist, and they probably do, the regulated monopoly has them and non-
monopoly retailers will have less of them.” However, with monopoly utilities there is pressure to disallow 
mergers of what are typically vertically integrated entities. With retail competition there is less objection to 
mergers and acquisitions of the retail businesses. In fact, at present neither of the largest two electricity 
retailers in the UK is a former incumbent electricity utility. 
23 Cf. Demsetz (1969), Kirzner (1973, ch. 4).  The critical treatment of marketing costs in some of the 
discussions is sometimes reminiscent of one side of the debates in the 1970s (e.g. Goldschmid et al. 1974). 
24 This includes by “dual fuel” provision (of electricity and gas) and other utility services such as water and 
telecoms, by wider joint marketing of other services, and by mergers and acquisitions of other supply 
businesses.   14
about 5% of such retail service costs
25.  In turn, retail service costs are about 5% of total 
price and generation costs are about 50%. Even a doubling of retail sales costs, or a 
twenty-fold increase in advertising costs, would be broadly offset by a 10% reduction in 




Neither of these reductions is implausible as a result of competitive pressures. Final 
prices to all customers in the UK are down by about 25% to 35% in real terms since 
privatisation, though of course many factors have contributed to this. In particular, there 
have been significant reductions in prices to residential customers associated with the 
advent of full retail competition, as discussed below. 
 
VI  Benefits and costs of full retail competition in the UK 
 
It is generally accepted that large and medium-sized customers in the UK have seen 
significant benefits from retail competition. There have been additional costs, principally 
those of installing half-hourly meters and communications equipment at customers’ 
premises, and upgrading IT systems of suppliers. The benefits to these customers have 
outweighed their costs. The main debate has been whether it has been worthwhile to 
allow retail competition for smaller and residential customers. Much of the debate has 
been over whether it was worthwhile to incur the costs of load profiling and upgrading 
settlement systems to make retail choice possible for all customers. It would typically not 
be economic for an individual customer to choose another supplier unless such systems 
were in place.  
 
Various attempts have been made to compare the costs and benefits of full retail 
competition in the UK. Cost-benefit analysis is difficult enough after a policy has been 
implemented and the consequences observed, let alone before it. This is particularly the 
case when the policy involves opening up the possibility of new choices and behaviour 
never available before. Nevertheless, the Parliamentary Select Committee insisted that 
OFFER make an assessment in February 1997 before the market opened over the period 
September 1998 to May 1999.  
 
Design of the systems and the allowable extent of pooling, settlement and other IT costs 
was then under negotiation with the companies, whose estimates varied widely. OFFER 
(1997a) put the total undiscounted costs over ten years in the range £375 to £1355 million 
(£40 to £140 million a year). Illustrative total benefits were put in the range £6 to £8 
                                                 
25  These retail service costs are separate from the costs of generation and of using the transmission and 
distribution systems.  In the UK, data is available on the retail supply business operating costs divided into 
four components with the following average proportions: customer service and other costs including billing 
and customer records 58%, revenue collection 25%, bad debts 10% and advertising and marketing 7%. 
(OFFER, 1997, 43, para. 6.23). The last component may correspond to Joskow’s 5% selling costs. 
26 To clarify the arithmetic, if total price to customers is 100, the two components discussed here are 
generation 50 and retail service costs 5.  Contained within the latter are sales costs 0.25 and advertising 
0.025.   15
billion over ten years (£600 to £800 million a year). These came mainly from more 
efficient purchasing and from greater competition in generation
27. 
 
Green and McDaniel (1998), also writing before the event, agreed that there would be 
benefits to customers, which they put at over £300 million a year. However, they argued 
that these would be essentially transfers from electricity companies and the coal industry, 
with no net social benefit. Consequently the policy would have a net social loss roughly 
in the amount of the extra settlement and other costs. 
 
The National Audit Office (NAO) (2001) carried out a study with data up to June 2000, 
when the domestic market had been open for just over a year. It noted that Ofgem had 
allowed the utility companies to recover some £850 million in additional costs (£121 
million per year for seven years). It estimated that since the market opened, 6.5 million 
customers had switched supplier and seen their bills fall by £299 million, of which about 
half (£143 million) was attributable to competition and the other half (£156 million) to 
tighter retail price caps. The customers that had not switched supplier had benefited from 
the lower price caps but most had not seen further savings. The NAO concluded that 
domestic customers had benefited from competition. 
 
MacKerron (2001) challenged this assessment, arguing that the £156 million price cap 
saving was irrelevant, that part of the £143 million savings attributed to competition 
reflected dual fuel and direct debit discounts that could have been achieved without it, 
and that customer transactions costs had been omitted. He doubted whether there was as 
much scope as the NAO and Ofgem hoped for future reductions in costs of retailing and 
generation purchasing. He concluded that the policy had probably made consumers worse 
off. 
 
However, it is arguable that the price cap reductions are not irrelevant to the assessment 
of policy (Littlechild, 2001b). Both the NAO and MacKerron ignore the positive effects 
of extending retail competition on competition in the generation market, as reflected in 
lower Pool and contract prices. They also fail to credit full retail competition for the 
reductions in coal purchase prices that had previously only been sustained by virtue of the 
retail monopoly over smaller customers. Full retail competition also facilitated the 
reallocation and reduction of costs in setting tighter distribution price controls. All these 
cost reductions were reflected in tighter retail price caps that took effect at the time that 
the residential market was due to open. The proportion of cost reductions properly 
attributable to extending retail competition is necessarily debatable, but that is not to say 
it is zero or negligible. So, measuring the benefits of full retail competition in terms of 
price reductions compared to the tighter price cap is already to undervalue these benefits. 
 
It seems implausible to assume that reductions in generation and coal prices are simply 
transfers that have no effect on the costs of producing these products. Costs are not given 
                                                 
27 The relevant benefit here is the incremental effect on wholesale competition of extending retail 
competition to residential customers, given that it had already been implemented for larger customers. The 
impact would derive from competitive pressures across the board instead of half the buying side subject to 
cost-pass-through regulation.   16
exogenously: lower prices force competitors to improve or leave the market to those who 
are more efficient.
28 There is ample evidence of real cost reductions throughout the 
industry as a result of competition and tighter price controls.
29 Again, the appropriate 
proportions attributable to full retail competition are debatable, but not negligible. 
 
As to the other benefits cited, most customers are indeed now able to change the way 
they pay for electricity without changing supplier. However, as the NAO said, suppliers’ 
efforts to retain or win customers in the competitive market are likely to have contributed 
significantly to these further savings. 
 
Shuttleworth (2001) responded on behalf of MacKerron. He reaffirmed their argument in 
the phrase “if you can do it under monopoly, it isn’t a benefit of competition.” He 
suggested that appropriate action by government and/or regulator could have achieved 
many of the benefits claimed for competition.  
 
But how far is this true? Austrian and public choice economists have been arguing over 
the last quarter of a century that Governments and regulators typically do not have either 
the knowledge or incentive to do all these things. Competition is precisely a way of 
providing the relevant information and incentivising the market participants to use it to 
benefit customers.  
 
VIII   Removing the price control 
 
It would be remiss to conclude this paper without noting the developments in retail 
competition that enabled the UK regulator to remove the transitional price cap there. I 
have elsewhere summarized the situation as follows (Littlechild, 2002a). 
 
In November 2001 Ofgem (2001) came to review the control yet again. It 
considered a variety of factors. There was a high level of awareness of competing 
suppliers from various sources; general satisfaction with the service provided; and 
switching supplier was perceived to be easy. Around 100,000 customers had been 
switching supplier each week, slightly up on the previous year; net switching 
away from the incumbent had also increased slightly; nearly 40 per cent of all 
customers had switched supplier at least once, about double the level achieved a 
year earlier; and the pattern of switching was similar for all socioeconomic 
groups. The average proportion of customers retained by the incumbent supplier 
had fallen from 90 per cent two years earlier to 70 per cent.  
 
Whereas only two incumbent companies had set their prices below the price cap 
two years ago, and then by less than one percent, now all but three offered a 
                                                 
28 Green and McDaniel acknowledged that “this conclusion [a net social loss] might be reversed if 
competitive pressure leads to significant additional cost savings in future”.  Their estimates suggested that a 
supply cost reduction of 10% would suffice to do this.  If I understand correctly, if even one third of all 
competitive price reductions in their model were translated into real savings, this would imply a net social 
gain from full retail competition. 
29 To take a simple example, manpower in the incumbent companies, both generation and distribution, is 
down by about two thirds on average since privatisation.   17
reduction, of up to about two percent. The median discounts available on the 
incumbent supplier’s prices ranged from 5 to 13 per cent for the Standard Credit 
tariff, from 6 to 14 per cent for direct debit, and from 1 to 8 per cent for 
prepayment.  
 
Ofgem reports that the range of tariffs and offers available to customers has 
continued to widen and become more innovative. For example, green tariffs, 
energy efficiency deals, offers targeted at disadvantaged customers, dual fuel 
tariffs, affinity deals and online services have been taken up by more suppliers. 
Suppliers have become more responsive to customer demands. Further 
innovations have emerged including loyalty cards, offers aimed at students, tariffs 
with no standing charge, “double the difference” offers, an offer to buy back 
excess solar energy generated by customers in their homes, tariffs including low 
energy light bulbs or a new fridge/freezer trade-in offer for disadvantaged 
customers, a Stay Warm tariff which allows customers aged over 60 to pay a 
fixed amount for their fuel throughout the year (irrespective of actual 
consumption and spread evenly over the year), insurance offers, and combined 
bills including gas, electricity and home telephone. 
 
There have been mergers and acquisitions among suppliers, and there has been 
other entry and exit. The number of suppliers making offers has fallen, but there is 
still a reasonable spread of offers. There is evidence of a competitive market 
process at work: “Suppliers that were in October 2000 making price offers in 
excess of the local incumbent have now either left the market or reduced prices so 
as to offer a discount to the incumbent.” (p. 62) More suppliers are now offering 
price discounts to prepayment customers. 
 
Ofgem noted a few remaining barriers to entry, principally trading arrangements 
in Scotland and problems associated with access to prepayment meter facilities. 
These had not precluded competition, and Ofgem indicated the action it was 
taking to address the issues. 
 
In view of this evidence of increasing competition, Ofgem proposed to eliminate 
the supply price restraints at the end of March 2002. It had already eliminated 
most restraints on gas supply prices a couple of years earlier. 
 
Ofgem (2002) confirmed this proposal, and shortly afterwards removed the controls as 
secheduled. 
 
VIII Concluding comment 
 
Green and McDaniel (1998) conclude their evaluation of competition in electricity supply 
with the following remark. 
There is also the Austrian view of competition as a process of discovery – no one 
can predict the new services which a new entrant might profitably provide. An   18
optimistic view might be that it is worth incurring the transactions costs and short-
term losses in order to create these opportunities. 
 
Credit is due to Israel Kirzner for elucidating and developing this Austrian view of 
competition as a process of discovery. His work has helped to give policymakers the 
confidence to create the opportunities for the competitive process to work in retail 
electricity supply. The present paper has provided evidence of innovative services in the 
UK, and argued that the benefits of competition do indeed outweigh any transactions 
costs and short-term losses involved. It is to be hoped that this will enable a better 
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